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ILLEGAL MEXICAN IMMIGRATION: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
I. Introduction
Few topics more fundamentally touch the essence of the American ex-
perience than the topic of immigration. An ethnically heterogeneous popu-
lation in search of a homogeneous national identity has been the history
of the United States. In its evolving and often controversial role, immi-
gration policy has been instrumentally involved in such diverse areas of
public concern as human resource policy, foreign policy, labor policy,
agricultural policy, and race policy. Yet until only recently, immigra-
tion policy itself has been among the least examined of all public policy
measures.
II. Components of Immigration Policy
Immigration policy consists of an evolving and complex set of satu-
tory laws, administrative rulings, and court decisions. The federal agency
responsible for the administration of the immigration statutes is the il11T1i-
gration and Naturalization Services (INS) of the U.S. Department of Justice.
With the enactment of the comprehensive Immigration Act of 1965, sub-
stantial changes were made to the previous body of immigration policy. The
Act was designed primarily to end the ethnocentric policies of earlier
legislation.l Little consideration was given to possible labor market
ramifications.2 The new immigration system continued the past humanistic
1
2tendencies of the immigration system by accentuating family reunification
as the highest entry priority consideration. For the first time, however,
the Act of 1965 set an aggregate ceiling of 120,000 persons from all Western
Hemispheric nations but no ceiling was set at the tim~ on individual
countries. For the Eastern Hemisphere, the ceiling was placed at 170,000
with a 20,000 person maximum allowed from anyone country. In subsequent
years, the total hemisphere ceiling (290,000 persons) has been annually
exceeded due to quota exemptions for parents, spouses, and children. Mexico
became the major source of legal immigrants. It averaged about 54,000 im-
migrants a year between 1966 and 1976, with the average increasing to about
66,000 immigrants a year between 1972 and 1976.3 Effective January 1, 1977,
-,'
the statutes were again amended to set a ceiling of 20,000 per country on
all Western Hemisphere nations.4
III. A General Overview of the Issues
As the nation's formal immigration policy has developed, it has passed
through three distinct eras: no restriction of any kind (prior to 1888);
numerical restriction based upon ethnic discrimination (from 1888 to 1965);
and numerical restriction with ~thnic equality (since 1965). With the advent
of the legal and numerical restrictions. of course, has come the problem of
illegal immigration. The two issues are, therefore, inter-related and must
be discussed together.
Under the 1965 act, the total number of legal immigrants admitted to
the United States has averaged about 400,000 persons a year (or twice the
its enactment).5 About 60 percent
directly into the labor force.6
annual flow for the 41 years prior to
of the legally ddmitted immigrants go
3Accordingly, legal immigration has accounted for upwards to 12 percent of
the annual increase of the civilian labor force since 1969.7 Allowance
for emigration would reduce this figure but it is not known by how much.
These percentages, of course, do not include any estimates of the influence
of illegal immigration.
The present legal system gives highest priority to family re-unification.
In 1975, for instance, 72 percent of all visas were granted on the basis of
family reunification.8 For the small remainder a nominal effort is made
to see that legal immigration does not adversely affect the domestic labor
market. The Secretary of labor has since 1952 been empowered to block the
entry of legal immigrants if their presence would in any way threaten pre-
vailing wage standards and employment opportunities.9 The Act of 1965
bolstered the permissive language of the earlier legislation by making it
a mandatory requirement that non-family related immigrants who are job-
seekers receive a labor certification.10 But even in these few cases,
there is no probationery categories that were the conditions of their
certification. Perhaps even more revealing of the lack of concern for
local labor market impact is the fact that about 40 percent of all certi-
fication since 1970 have occurred after the applicant had already ill~gal-
ly entered the country and secured a job.ll
Thus, on paper, the legal immigration system appears to be both reason-
able (in the numbers of persons it annuallyadmitSh fair (in terms of its
ethnic impartiality), and humane (in the dominance of family reunion and
refugee accommodation over labor market impact considerations).
Yet the legal immigration system of the United States has been rendered
a mockery. Illegal immigration has become the major avenue of entry. In
41976, for instance, a total of 875,915 illegal aliens were apprehended
by the INS. This figure represents a 500 percent increase over the fig-
ure of a mere decade earlier. To be sure, these apprehension figures
are artificially inflated due to the fact that many persons are caught
are not caught.
On the other hand, the vast majority of illegal aliens
Various reports and studies all admittedly imperfect--
more than once.
have placed the accumulated stock of illegal aliens from 3-12 million
persons.
Whenthe annual numerical flow of legal immigrants is combined with
conservative estimates of both the annual or numerical flow and the a€cu-
mu1ated stock of illegal immigrants, it is apparent that the United States
a'
is in the throes of the largest infusion of immigrants in its history. The
combined magnitudes--even using conservative estimates--means that there
must be significant labor market implications.
IV. The Absence of an Enforceable Policy
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into the continuing debate
over who the illegal immigrants are, howmany there are, or to attempt to
assess their economic impact.12, All of these issues are topics in and of
themselves. Rather, the concern is with the what should be the central
issue of policy regardless of how the aforementioned questions are answered.
Namely, there is a prima facie case that the current immigration statutes
of the United States are totally unenforceable.
As is evident from any elementary economics text book, the study of
political economy begins with the confines that mark the political boundar-
ies of nation states. Borders are the realities that restrict the movement
5of money, products, and people. They also separate cultures and ideo10gi-
ca1 systems. It is within these borders that the vast preponderance of
public policy measures that affect the welfare of the citizens of each
nation state are made. To be certain, there is a world economy and no
major industrial state can expect to survive for long as an isolated entity.
But the fact remains that policy-making beyond one nation's boundaries is
the exception rather than the rule.
Just as every nation in the world has sought to enact policies that
affect the import and export of products across its boundaries, so has
each sought to regulate the immigration of people. In the case of the
United States, there is an elaborate system of tariffs, quotas, credits,
and exchange rates that affect both the import and export of goods. To
be sure, all of these policy components vary at different times. But
they are reasonably effective in the accomplishment of their specified
goals. Likewise, immigration policy has changed over time as well. But
in sharp contrast to the prevailing policies that regulate the flow of
goods, current immigration policy has proven to be incapable of accomp1ish-
ing its stated objectives. In essence, the alternatives are either to do
nothing (and thereby continue t~e fascade that the nation has a stated
policy, but chooses to ignore its inability to accomplish its objectives);
to abolish the immigration statutes and let labor supply pressures and
market forces find a level of international equilibrium with respect to
wages, work standards, and employment opportunities; or the nation can
seek to enact an immigration policy that is capable of accomplishing its
stated objectives.
It is the thesis of this paper that the third a1ternative--to strive
for an enforceable immigration po1icy--is not only imperative, but it is
6also inevitable.
v. The Factors that Render Current Policy Ineffective
A complex set of factors is responsible for the growth of illegal
immigrati on. Masses of people--such as those in the Mexico and Caribbean
area--leave the familiarity of their homeland and go to an unknown land
only if both push and pull pressures are operative. In most instances
the IpUSh" factors derive momentum from the related issues of over-
population, massive poverty, and high unemployment. Of increasing sig-
nificance are the pervasive structural changes that are occuring within
the labor forces of many underdeveloped nations, changes that stem from
technological developments and rural-to-urban migration. Likewise,
there are the strong economic "pull" factors that emanate from the United
States. The relatively higher wages and broader array of available job
opportunities of the American economy function as a powerful human
magnet.
Related to these broad forces are several other considerations. Amer-
ican employers are often willing to tap this pool of scared and dependent
workers. Prevailing immigration. law does not place any penalty upon the
act of employing illegal aliens. Because of the "Texas proviso" in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, employment does not constitute
the illegal act of harboring.
As for the aliens who have entered the country illegally, 95 percent
of those apprehended are given "a voluntary departure. II They are simply
returned to their homeland as quickly as possible and often at the expense
of the government. Any law under which 95 percent of the violators are
not punished can hardly be taken seriously as a deterrant.
7Moreover, the INS, which has the responsibility for enforcement of
the immigration statutes, has a force and budget that are miniscule rela-
tive to its assigned duties. As of 1977, there were fewer than two
thousand border patrol officers plus niriehundred additional inspectors
and investigators for inland duty. Only a fraction of these are actually
on duty in any given eight-hour shift of any given day.
VI. The Reform of Prevailing Policy
Having completed a brief.review of the prevailing immigration system
of the United States, it is apparent that it contains little order; is
inconsistent in its objectives; and its few prohibitions are observed
more in their breech than in their adherence. The current system is in-
effective primarily because it is unenforceable. As the scale of immi-
gration in all of its forms has increased dramatically in the past decade,
the absence of a meaningful immigration system has become both more
obvious in its effects and more ominous in its implications. The immigra-
tion system should be liberal in the number of persons it admits; fair in
its assurances that non-discrimination on any ethnic basis shall continue
to be the foundation for its sel~ction criteria; and equitable to the.
citizens and workers of the communities in which immigrants settle. It
is, of course, in the area of equity that the adverse consequences of the
area of equity that the adverse consequences of the unenforceability of
the prevailing immigration system are manifested. A number of policy
changes are in order.
In groping for the proper course for public policy to pursue, one
must begin with the stark realization that in a free society illegal
8immigration cannot be totally stopped. No consensus will support the
erection of a "Berlin Wall in reverse" that is designed to keep people
out rather than in--or any equivalent drastic step. The best that
possibly can be hoped is that the problem can be brought within manage-
able proportions.
The mandatory first step is the passage of a federal statute that
will forbid the employment of illegal aliens. Such a bill has cleared
the U.S. House of Representatives in 1972 and 1974 only to die in a com-
mittee of the Senate. Passage of a federal statute of this nature is a
must. The message must be clear that the employment of illegal aliens
is an illegal act. Strong civil and, perhaps, criminal penalties should
be set for repeat offenders.
Candidly speaking, one must say that the enactment of a law against
employment of illegal aliens will not accomplish much. Such a law wi11
depend upon proof that the employer "knowingly" broke the law. Proving
this will be immensely difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, it is
very doubtful that many district attorneys would press for enforcement
or that many juries would convict an employer for the offense of provid-
ing jobs to anyone. With court pockets already back-logged with serious
crimes, it is hard to imagine that many employers would ever be brought
to trial. Yet the possibility of prosecution would exist. Moreover,
there would be some voluntary compliance and, at least, the moral weight
of the law would be against the employment of illegal aliens. As meaning-
less as such a ban may prove to be, nothing else makes sense until such
a law is on the books.
The obvious question that follows is how does an employer know if a
person is
9citizen or not? A query is hardly sufficient. With fraudulent documents
easily accessible to anyone desiring themt mere possession of any of the
stQndard means of identification would likewise be no deterrent. The
only answer is the issuance of noncouterfeitable and unalterable social
security cards to the entire population. Through the use of special codes
already developed by cryptographers and computer expertst such a social
security card would allow easy verification of the citizenship status of
any would-be employee. It was announced by INS in 1977 that a similar
noncounterfeitable card will be issued to the 4.2 million resident aliens
who live in this country. It willt in essencet become their identity card.
There aret of courset legitimate fears about the establishment of
what is tantamount to a work permit system in this country. Despite the
fact that work permits are used in all other free nations of the world,
it is true that authoritarian governments also use them as a means of
citizen controlt thus depriving citizens of civil liberties. The social
security card, however, is already required as a condition of employment
of virtually everyone. Like it or nott the social security number has
already become a national identification system. The social security
number is used as a student number on many campuses; it is used as the
driver's license number in many states; it is used by the Internal Revenue
Service to identify taxpayers; and it is the serial number of all people
in the military. The point is: it is absurd to worry about whether some-
thing will happen if it has already happened! The only questions that
remain are should social security cards be made noncounterfeitable and
should checks be made of these cards to assure that those who are using
them to seek employment are legally entitled to have them? Certainly no
10
one can seriously disagree with such objectives.
The necessity of significantly enlarging the number of INS enforce-
ment officials is too obvious to be belabored. As long as this staff is
less than the size of the police force of the city of Houston, there is
absolutely no way that even the current statutes can be enforced. Aside
from apprehension of illegal aliens, the agency has numerous other duties
to perform. A substantial increase in the number of INS enforcement
officers would be by far the most effective short-run deterrent that could
be initiated. In addition, the INS should have exclusive responsibility
for checking all persons who pass through inspection ports of entry.
It is essential that the INS rely less on the voluntary departure
system. The policy objective that illegal aliens are unwanted guests can
never be taken seriously as long as there is virtually no chance of any
penalty being imposed on offenders. Until all illegal aliens can be
identified, records kept. and repeat offenders subjected to formal depor-
tation (which would permanently preclude those individuals from ever be-
coming legal immigrants), there is no reason for an illegal alien to even
ponder the risks--the alien has nothing to lose. More reliance on legal
procedures, however, will be costly and time consuming and will a1sonec-
essitate an increase in the INS budget. But these costs, as well as ex-
penses related to the acquisition of more detection hardware, must be
weighted against the aforementioned costs of allowing this mushrooming
problem to continue. It will be far less costly to assume a strong posture
of prevention than it will be to respond to the social problems inherent in
this issue after they accumulate.
In the same vein, international policies must be part of the policy
mix to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants. These must address the "push"
11
factors; they should be directed primarily at efforts to assist in the
economic development of the hemispheric neighbors of Mexico and the
Caribbean area. These measures should include extensive offers of tech-
nical and financial assistance. It may be that efforts of this kind
must be made through established multinational agencies--such as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the United Nations--
instead of unilaterally. Mexico, in particular, is a proud nation; its
leaders abhor the concept of direct foreign aid.
It must be realized that to some degree the illegal alien problem
from Mexico is a by-product of past actions by the United States. For
too many years, Mexico was seen as a pool of cheap labor that could be
tapped at will throughout the Southwest. Hence, U.S. policymakers cannot
be oblivious of the involvement of policy in the creation of the problem.
For this past role the United States is obligated to assist the Mexican
government in the reduction of the economic forces that continue to push
many of its citizens into the illegal immigration stream. To be sure,
the population explosion, the rural-to-urban migration, and the structural
labor market changes resulting from technological change in Mexico would
cause the illegal alien flow to 9ccur regardless of any past actions by
the United States. But that contention is really moot. The fact is that
the United States did contribute to some of the forces that have institu-
tionalized the illegal alien process. The United States cannot place the
full responsibility to stop the flow upon Mexico.
The United States should carefully reassess its trade and tariff
policies pertaining to Mexico. Efforts to lessen the restrictive barriers
to agricultural and manufacturing imports from Mexico should be initiated
12
at once. Such action would enhance the opportunities for Mexican export
industries to expand and reduce some of the pressures causing illegal
entry. It would also acknowledge the fact that Mexico is already a major
importer of American-made goods. It might seem inconsistent to argue for
a restrictive border policy toward Mexican aliens while favoring increased
free trade with respect to the import of Mexican products. This is not so.
The impact of increased imports can be more widely spread throughout the
American economy. If there were any adverse domestic employment effects
from increased imports, those effects could be determined more easily than
in the case of illegal immigration. Moreover, there already exists legis-
lation (the Trade Act of 1974) that provides substantial benefits to assist
those particular industries and workers who may be harmed by such liberal
trade pOlicy adjustments. Nothing is available for those citizen workers
who are adversely affected by unfair competition from illegal aliens.
To a slightly lesser degree the same arguments could apply to many of
the nations of the Caribbean area. The United States has long manifested
political, economic, and military interest in the affairs of this region.
The establishment of a regional economic commonmarket is long overdue.
With economic assistance and relaxed tariffs some of the outward pressures
on illegal immigration from these countries may be stemmed.
With respect to Mexico one change in the legal immigration system must
be made. The imposition of the 20,000 person quota to Mexico in 1977 was
arbitrary. The low quota serves only as an additional prod to illegal entry.
Mexico deserves a continuation of the special treatment that it has always
been accorded in the past. Although some ceiling should be imposed, it
should at least be in rough approximation to past legal immigration levels.
13
The final step that must be taken to end the problem of illegal im-
migration is granting general amnesty to all illegal aliens who have been
in this country since January 1~ 1973~ providing that they register with
the INS within an established grace period and that they have no record
of criminal activity. The date of January 1~ 1973 is chosen because it
was on that date that amendments to the Social Security Act took effect
that specified that applicants for Social Security cards be required for
the first time to furnish evidence of their citizenship.13 There is prece-
dent for such an amnesty. In 1965 amnesty was granted to all illegal
aliens living in the United States prior to 1948. There should be abso-
1ute1y no intention to issue another amnesty at some subsequent date.
Because the tolerant policy of the past has unofficially condoned the in-
flux of a1iens~ it is unrealistic to believe that any roundup of aliens who
have established themselves in jobs and have families could be accomplished
without serious hardship and much ill will. The accomplishment of the goal
of ridding the labor market of illegal aliens should not be contrary to
basic humanitarian concepts. Hence~ amnesty is a must but only as the last
step of a comprehensive program.
VI. The Proposals of the Carter Administration
On August 4~ 1977 the long delayed proposals of theCarter Administration
for reform of the immigration system were made pub1ic.14 The accompanying
system message noted that "at least 60 countries are significant regular
source countries."15
A key element of the comprehensive package is the call for employer sanc-
tions. Hiring illegal aliens would be made an illegal act. Enforcement~
14
however, would be limited to those employers who engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of hiring illegal aliens. Injunctive relief and civil fines
of up to $1,000 per alien would be the penalties. A list of acceptable
identification items--including the existing social security card--would
be prepared by the Justice Department. To be in compliance, an employer
need only to see that they have seen one of them. Of crucial importance
is the fact that the employers would not be required to verify the authen-
ticity of the identification nor would they be required to keep records
of the documents they have seen.
The proposed employer sanctions would pre-empt all existing state and
local laws that prohibit the employment of illegal aliens. As of the time
of the President's proposals, 3 cities and 12 states had enacted such
'.'
statutes and 15 additional states had similar proposals pending. The con-
stitutionality of these state bans was unexpectedly upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1976.16 The Court held that a California law forbidding the
employment of illegal aliens did not invade the exclusive authority of
the federal government to set immigration policy.
Accompanying the employer sanctions would be "increased enforcement"
of the Fair Labor Standards (FL~A) and the Federal Farm Labor Contractor
Registration Act as well as improved liaison between INS and FLSAenforce-
ment personnel. Increased vigilance would be requested of the Equal
EmploymentOpportunity Commission to assure that minority citizens are
not adversely affected by any discriminatory fall-out from the alien hiring
ban. Criminal penalties would be invoked against persons who act as human
smugglers and brokers of alien workers.
The plan also calls for almost a doubling of the enforcement personnel
15
of the INS. Criminal penalties would be sought for those who provide
false identification documents.
But perhaps the most controversial portion of the proposal deals
with the question of amnesty. Permanent resident alien states would be
given to all illegal entrants who have lived continuously in the United
States since January 1, 1970. These persons would be eligible for full
citizenship after waiting the normal five year interval. For those per-
sons who entered after January 1, 1970 but before January 1, 1977, a new
class of "temporary resident a1ien" would be created. These persons would
be required to register with the INS within one year and they would be
allowed to remain in this country in this new status for a period of five
yea rs . They would not be allowed to bring in any family members and they
would be ineligible for almost all federally assisted social programs (e.g.,
food stamps, medicaid, and Aid for Families with Dependent Children). The
adjustment status of all affected persons would not be counted against the
existing legal quotas regardless of country of origin. Anyone who has
entered the country since January 1, 1977 would be deported upon apprehension.
The proposal also includes foreign policy provisions. Negotiations
would be sought with Mexico and.other source nations to seek their assistance
in the enforcement and anti-smuggling provisions. Furthermore, consideration
would be given to ecnomic assistance to source countries to develop labor
intensive projects. Information would also be given, if requested, about
birth control methods. Increased trade with sending countries for the export
of labor intensive projects would "be exp1ored".
Finally, the proposal calls for a comprehensive intra-agency study of
the current immigration system. This would be the first thorough review
16
since 1952. It was also announced that the Administration would support
an increase in the current 20,000 person quota on annual immigration from
Mexico (which has a demand in excess of this number) and Canada (which is
not currently using its full allotment) to a combined total of 50,000
persons.
The Carter Plan was introduced as a "courtesy" into the Senate (as
5.2252) and into the House of Representatives (as H.R. 9531). In each of
the past three sessions of Congress, the House has initiated action on
immigration. In most instances, the House received much criticism from
all sorts of groups adverse to some or all of its reform proposals. In
most instances, the Senate did not even act on the bills even at the House
in the lurch. This time the House decided to let the Senate initiate
"
action before the House again commits itself. The Senate did hold perfunc-
tory hearings in May 1978 but no action was taken to enact the Administration1s
package by the time Congress adjourned in October 1978.
VII. Assessment and Concluding Observations
Obviously, the Carter plan is the product of a series of compromises
within the Administration and b~tween its political supporters. It is
highly probable that if Congress does ultimately act that it too will seek
to make a number of changes, additions, and deletions. Ultimately the courts
will be involved as there are certain to be numerous ambiguous and contro-
versia1 parts of such an ambitious policy initiative.
Looking, however, at the Carter Plan, it is apparent that it resembles
in part but differs in significant degree from the comprehensive proposals
outline in Section VI of this paper. There is no need to repeat the
17
similarities but the differences do bear elaboration.
The most crucial difference pertains to the critical identification
question. The Department of Labor had sought to address the question head-
on by re-issuing social security cards in a non-counterfeitable form. This
card would have been the accepted identifier. The Department of Justice,
however, feared civil liberties criticisms over the establishment of such
a system and its position prevailed. As a result, the proposed employer
sanctions provision is essentially meaningless. The real efficacy of the
reform proposals, therefore, is in serious doubt.
The proposed two tier provisions for adjusting the status of the
illegal entrants already in the country is of dubious merit. For those
potentially eligible for permanent citizenship, it is unclear what is meant
~-'
by the term IIcontinuouslyll living in this country. As for the temporary
resident alien status, it is widely believed that after five years that
they too will be eligible for permanent resident alien status. But because
there is no certainty that this will be the case, it will raise fears by
many illegal entrants as to the wisdom of exposing their whereabouts through
registration. Many may not come forth. Likewise, it is certainly question-
able that a law can or should pr:'event families from being unified for up-
wards of five years. Also, by specifically declaring these persons to be
ineligible for prevailing social legislation, aliens who are in dire need
will be denied services.
The Carter proposal does recognize the need to enhance trade opportun-
ities for source nations but it does not specifically recognize the neces-
sity of tariff reductions. Nor does it take the opportunity to press for
such a venture as a commonmarket of Caribbean and/or North American continent
nations. Reducing the IIpushll pressures for i llega 1 immigration shoul d be
18
given equal attention with those measures designed to reduce the IIpullll
forces. In the proposed package, this is not the case.
Yet, despite its apparent deficiencies, the reform proposals do
acknowledge at the highest level of our government that the existing immi-
gration laws are unenforceable. They do recognize the urgency to alter
the ineffectural system that currently exists. They have attracted pub-
licity to the issue and they have generated substantial public discussion.
Immigration reform has not yet received the priority it deserves but, at
least, it is now firmly secure on the nation's agenda of needed social
action. The issue is no longer whether the nation will act but, rather,
when and in what fashion.
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